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Abstract 
 
Background and objectives: Previous research has provided insufficient evidence on the factorial 
validity of the negative cognitive style questionnaires, which is a problem for the validity of the total 
score’s computation. In Study 1, we focused on the relationship between internality and the other 
dimensions of negative cognitive style. In Study 2, we explored the predictive validity of negative 
cognitive style for negative interpretation bias. 
Methods: In Study 1, 770 participants completed the Cognitive Style Questionnaire – Short Form 
(CSQ-SF). In Study 2, from a prescreening data collection (N = 300) we selected participants with 
low (N = 40) and high (N = 32) cognitive vulnerability to depression who were primed with negative 
mood induction and who completed a generative interpretation task. 
Results: In Study 1, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the best fitting model for the 
CSQ-SF was a bifactor model without the internality dimension. In Study 2, a CFA replicated the 
factorial structure of Study 1 and individuals with a high negative cognitive style exhibited a negative 
interpretation bias after controlling for depressive symptoms. 
Limitations: The university-age sample limited the generalizability of our results to different 
populations, and the lack of longitudinal data prevented us from discussing further implications on 
the relationship between the negative interpretation bias and negative cognitive style in predicting 
depression. 
Conclusions: Together, the results of our two studies support the construct validity of the CSQ-SF 
and recommend the use of a composite score of negative cognitive style without internality. 
 
Keywords: negative cognitive style; cognitive style questionnaire; internality; interpretation bias; 
negative mood induction 
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Highlights 
 Internality poorly discriminates between high and low vulnerability to depression 
 We propose a bifactor structure of the CSQ-SF in which internality is excluded 
 Negative cognitive style predicts negative interpretation bias 
 The revised CSQ-SF shows good factorial and predictive validity 
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1. Introduction 
Depression is a highly debilitating psychiatric disorder with severe consequences at the 
personal and societal level (Demyttenaere et al., 2004). Depressive symptoms, such as negative mood, 
feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness, concentration problems, fatigue, sleep problems, and 
suicidal thoughts, are among the leading causes of general poor health and disability worldwide (da 
Silva Lima & de Almeida Fleck, 2007), and depression is increasingly considered as a global health 
priority (Cuijpers, Beekman, & Reynolds, 2012). Given such a dismal scenario, it is crucial to shed 
light on the mechanisms that enhance the likelihood of developing major depression in order to set 
up effective preventive programs (Muñoz, Cuijpers, Smit, Barrera, & Leykin, 2010).  
The cognitive vulnerability hypothesis (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Beck, 1967; 
Beck, 1987) states that the onset of depression can be triggered by negative life events (i.e., occasion 
setters) interacting with dysfunctional cognitive processes (i.e., vulnerability).  
Among the earliest theories of depression is the hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & 
Alloy, 1989), which maintains that a major vulnerability factor for depression is a negative cognitive 
style, which includes, (a) beliefs that the causes of negative events are stable and global, (b) 
inferences of other negative consequences deriving from a negative event, and (c) inferences of 
negative characteristics of the self, given the negative event (self-worth implications)1. Importantly, 
there is solid evidence that individuals characterized by negative cognitive style are at risk of 
experiencing hopelessness and, in turn, depression (Haeffel et al., 2008; Marchetti, in press; 
Marchetti, Loeys, Alloy, & Koster, 2016; Mac Giollabhui et al., 2018). 
The Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Alloy et al., 2000) was designed to capture the 
dimensions proposed by the hopelessness theory—namely, stability, globality, negative 
consequences, and self-worth implications. As a revision of a previous instrument (i.e., Attributional 
                                                          
1 As compared to the reformulated learned helplessness theory (i.e., Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978), the role of internal attributions was deemphasized by the hopelessness theory 
(Abramson et al., 1989), in that they are supposed to have a specific effect on self-esteem (Haeffel 
et al., 2008), rather than on depression (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992). 
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Style Questionnaire; Peterson et al., 1982), the CSQ also measures internal causal attributions, which, 
however, are not routinely considered when evaluating one’s level of negative cognitive style (Liu, 
Kleiman, Nestor, & Cheek, 2015). 
Several versions of the CSQ have been developed to deal with different populations, such as 
children (Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire; Mezulis, Hyde, & Abramson, 2006) and 
adolescents (Adolescent Cognitive Style Questionnaire; Hankin & Abramson, 2002). Furthermore, 
because the original CSQ is extremely time demanding, with 144 items distributed across 24 scenarios 
(12 positive and 12 negative situations), the Cognitive Style Questionnaire – Short Form (CSQ-SF; 
Meins et al., 2012) with only eight negative scenarios was developed. Negative cognitive style, as 
measured by the CSQ, shows good nomological validity given that many predictions of the 
hopelessness theory have been empirically confirmed. For instance, a negative cognitive style 
requires interacting with stressful events to impact mental health (i.e., diathesis-stress hypothesis; 
Gibb, Beevers, Andover, & Holleran, 2006).  
Despite the massive use of CSQ-related instruments (Liu et al., 2015), no studies have 
thoroughly evaluated the internal structure of these scales by means of appropriate statistical tools, 
such as a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). An indication about the factorial structure of this 
construct could be derived from two studies examining the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(Higgins, Zumbo & Hay, 1999; Hewitt, Foxcroft, & MacDonald, 2004), which supports a three-factor 
solution (i.e., internality, stability, and globality). It is noteworthy to mention, however, that 
internality has routinely yielded lower internal consistency than the other dimensions (Asner-Self & 
Schreiber, 2004; Reivich, 1995). As for CSQ-related instruments, few studies have applied factor-
analytic techniques, and when they do, often only do so to summarize the item scores into broader 
manifest variables scores. For example, Hankin and Abramson (2002) tested a confirmatory three-
factor model of the Adolescent Cognitive Style Questionnaire summing its items to obtain two 
manifest variables for each of three latent dimensions—namely, negative inferences for cause, 
consequence, and self. Meins et al. (2012) applied a similar approach in their validation study of the 
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CSQ-SF. The authors subjected the total scores of the five CSQ-SF dimensions (internality, stability, 
globality, negative consequences, and self-worth implications) to a principal component analysis to 
produce a single global component of negative cognitive style. Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, Abela, 
and Adams (2007) applied an exploratory factor analysis to a complete set of CSQ item scores. 
Hankin et al. (2007), however, did not investigate the internal structure of the CSQ but only 
distinguished negative cognitive style from other related constructs (e.g., mood, dysfunctional 
attitudes, and rumination).  
Due to the fact that the internal structure of the CSQ is not well understood, the literature 
provides no straightforward recommendations about the proper scoring procedure for the CSQ (Liu 
et al., 2015). For instance, while some authors have computed total CSQ score by including all five 
dimensions of the CSQ (Caudek, 2014; Caudek, Ceccarini, & Sica, 2017; Newcomb-Anjo, Barker, 
& Howard, 2017), other authors instead have excluded the internality dimension (Alloy et al., 2000; 
Benas & Gibb, 2008; Iacoviello, Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 2006; Haeffel & Vargas, 
2011).  
It is worth noting that, according to the hopelessness theory, internality does not act as a 
vulnerability factor for depression because it can be either adaptive or maladaptive depending on the 
specific situation. For instance, when dealing with highly controllable stressors (i.e., failing an exam 
due to lack of preparation), internal attributions may be adaptive in improving future coping strategies 
and well-being (Gillham, Brunwasser, & Freres, 2008). Hence, in keeping with the hopelessness 
theory, several CSQ-SF validation studies have reported weak correlations between the internality 
dimension and the other CSQ dimensions (r  .31; Meins et al., 2012; Huys et al., 2016). Moreover, 
a recent meta-analytic study (Hu, Zhang, & Yang, 2015) revealed that internal causal attributions are 
poorly related to depressive symptoms (r = .15). 
For all these reasons, it is important to disentangle the role of internality in the negative 
cognitive style construct and, in turn, clarify which factorial structure provides the best 
operationalization of the construct postulated by the hopelessness theory. To this purpose, in Study 
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1, we explored the factorial validity of the CSQ-SF and investigated whether internality is a consistent 
dimension of negative cognitive style. 
In Study 2, we first retested Study 1’s confirmatory factor models, then we examined the 
relationship between negative cognitive style and the interpretation bias. In fact, cognitive 
vulnerability is not expressed only in terms of a negative cognitive style, as multiple mechanisms 
have been identified as facilitating factors for depression. Capitalizing on cross-fertilization between 
the hopelessness theory and Beck’s theory (Abramson et al., 2002), there is an increasing interest in 
understanding the relationship between negative cognitive style, on the one side, and information 
processing biases, such as attentional, memory, and self-referential biases, on the other (Alloy, 
Abramson, Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997; Caudek & Monni, 2013; Haeffel, Rozek, Hames, 
& Technow, 2012).  
Here, we will focus on the tendency to negatively interpret ambiguous information, that is, on a 
negative (information processing) interpretation bias, which is thought to increase the risk for 
depression by making negative content accessible in the mind and by fostering negative affect 
(Normansell & Wisco, 2017). To date, no studies have investigated the relationship between negative 
cognitive style and negative interpretation bias. On the one hand, we speculate that these two 
mechanisms are related to each other, in that both rely on altered appraisals or processing of 
personally relevant information (Alloy et al., 1999). On the other hand, we suggest that these two 
phenomena should be kept distinct, in that interpretation bias is present when ambiguous information 
is systematically processed in a negative way (Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & Reeder, 2016), whereas 
negative cognitive style is specifically activated when the individual faces negative events (Abramson 
et al., 2002). Given that a negative interpretation bias is considered to be a proximal cause of 
depression (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Everaert, Podina, & Koester, 2017), whereas negative cognitive 
style is deemed as a distal cause of depression (Abramson et al., 1989), we tested the predictive 
validity of the CSQ-SF in Study 2 by hypothesizing that a negative cognitive style may predict the 
presence of a negative interpretation bias. To do so, we classified participants into low or high 
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cognitive vulnerability groups, based on their level of negative cognitive style. Then, after one to 
three weeks, they were invited to complete a study consisting with a negative mood induction 
procedure, followed by an interpretation bias assessment. Given the relative insensitivity of self-
report questionnaires (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003), we administered a generative 
interpretation task to assess the participants’ negative interpretation bias. The mood induction 
procedure was justified by the diatheses-stress hypothesis, which postulates that a stressor is required 
to activate the individuals’ latent cognitive vulnerability (Ingram & Siegle, 2009; Segal & Ingram, 
1994). In our case, negative mood induction acted as a stressor aimed at activating the participants’ 
vulnerability.  
 
2. Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the psychometric properties of the CSQ-SF in order 
to shed light on its factorial structure and to clarify the role of the internality dimension in negative 
cognitive style. We compared the CSQ-SF subscales by means of descriptive statistics, inter-
correlations, mean corrected item-total correlations (CITCs), and corrected dimension-total 
correlations (CDTCs). Next, we conducted a CFA to test the internal structure of the CSQ-SF. Meins 
et al. (2012) proposed a unidimensional structure of negative cognitive style based on the total scores 
of its five dimensions. Conversely, in the present study, we evaluated the full structure of the CSQ-
SF by comparing six confirmatory models: three models with all five CSQ-SF dimensions’ items and 
three models in which we excluded the internality dimension’s items.  
Because the CSQ-SF’s main purpose is to identify those individuals who are more cognitively 
vulnerable to depression, we also investigated how well each of the five CSQ-SF dimensions can 
discriminate between individuals with low and high cognitive vulnerability. 
 
2.1 Materials and Methods 
2.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
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Participants were recruited via face-to-face requests associated with the snowball technique 
from introductory undergraduate psychology classes at the University of Florence, Italy. The sample 
consisted of 770 participants (27% males) with a mean age of 24.43 years (SD = 7.13). The study 
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participation in this study was 
anonymous and on a voluntary basis. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants 
included in the study. 
 
2.1.2 Instruments  
The CSQ-SF (Meins et al., 2012) consists of eight scenarios for which the respondents are 
asked to imagine the reason why that specific negative situation happened to them. Using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”), 72 items assess five 
dimensions of negative cognitive style, namely internality (e.g., “It is my fault if I am not in an 
intimate, romantic relationship”), globality (e.g., “The reason people reacted negatively to my talk 
will cause failures in all areas of my life”), stability (e.g., “The reason I failed to complete the work 
will cause similar failure in completing work in classes in the future”), negative consequences (e.g., 
“This negative evaluation will lead to other negative things happening to me”), and self-worth 
implications (e.g., “This person not wanting to be my friend means there is something wrong with 
me as a person”). 
The total scores range between 72 and 360, with a higher total score reflecting a higher 
negative cognitive style. Meins and colleagues (2012) reported positive correlations between the 
CSQ-SF dimensions, and the principal component analysis suggested a one-factor structure with 
65.08% of the observed variance explained. Internal consistency was considered good ( = .85). The 
CSQ-SF had been translated to and validated in Italian in earlier research (Sica, Caudek, Chiri, Ghisi, 
& Marchetti, 2012). The Italian CSQ-SF is reported in Supplementary Materials Appendix A.  
 
2.1.3 Statistical analysis 
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We conducted our analyses with the R software (R Core Team, 2018). Given the data’s ordinal 
nature, we performed CFAs with a diagonal weighted least squares (DWLS) estimator implemented 
in the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). To determine the fit of the CFA models, we considered the 
comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), the root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Hu and Bentler 
(1998) suggested that a good fit is indicated by values greater than or equal to .95 for TLI and CFI, 
less than or equal to .06 for RMSEA, and less than or equal to .08 for SRMR. We calculated internal 
consistency by means of categorical omega, that is, a method to calculate coefficient omega 
(McDonald, 1999) for categorical items (Green & Yang, 2009). Thus, we estimated  categorical 
omega total (ωt) and categorical omega hierarchical (ωh) by the parameter estimates from CFA with 
DWLS estimation method. The total variance of a multidimensional test was estimated by ωt, 
whereas, ωh was interpreted as an estimator of the items’ variance attributed to the general factor in 
a bifactor model (McDonald, 1999). 
 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Descriptive statistics of the Cognitive Style Questionnaire – Short Form 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the CSQ-SF total score and its five subscales 
(internality, globality, stability, self-worth implications, and negative consequences) are shown in 
Table 1. CSQ-SF items showed a slight deviation from normality with skewness ranging from -0.81 
to 1.41 and kurtosis ranging from -1.10 to 2.08. 
The internality dimension showed low-moderate correlations with both of the other CSQ-SF 
subscales and with the total CSQ-SF score. Also, we computed CITCs (defined as the correlation 
between the item and the total score without that specific item). Notably, the internality items showed 
a greater number of CITCs (13 out of 16) below the lower bound of .30 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) 
and a mean CITC of .32 (see Table 1). 
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Furthermore, looking at the CDTCs (defined as the correlation between the dimension and the 
total score with the specific dimension removed), internality seems to be inconsistent with the 
behavior of the other dimensions. Whereas the CDTCs for globality, stability, negative consequences 
and self-worth implications ranged between .64 and .76, the CDTC for internality was much lower (r 
= .32).  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of the CSQ-SF dimensions and total score. 
Note: Means (M) and standard deviations (SD), range of scores (Range), Pearson’s correlations (r), 
corrected dimension-total correlations (CDTCs), mean corrected item-total correlations (CITCs). 
 
2.2.2 Internal structure of the CSQ-SF 
Fit statistics for all the models tested are presented in Table 2. We estimated explained 
variance estimated by means of ωt. Our results showed that ωt increased along with increasing model 
complexity, favoring the bifactor model (Table 3). The incremental fit indices (CFI and TLI) can be 
used to compare the non-nested competing models, with greater values indicating the best model fit. 
The bifactor model for the CSQ-SF without internality showed the best fit indices, including 
a greater CFI and TLI. The ωh was .92, indicating that the general factor had a strong influence over 
Measure M(SD) Range r CDTCs CITCs 
   1 2 3 4 5   
1. Internality 50.21(5.80) 27 – 75      .32 .15 
2. Globality 38.32(7.23) 16 – 69 .22     .74 .37 
3. Stability 38.18(7.80) 16 – 66 .30 .68    .74 .40 
4. Negative consequences 18.54(4.79) 8 – 33 .13 .66 .58   .64 .40 
5. Self-worth implications 39.00(10.15) 16 – 75 .36 .67 .67 .58  .76 .48 
CSQ-SF Total score 184.24(28.18) 100 – 308 .49 .84 .85 .73 .89   
RUNNING HEAD: Measuring Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression 
 
the specific factors in explaining the items’ variance. Notably, values of ωh greater than .80 indicate 
that the total score may be conceived as essentially unidimensional (Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 
2016). Also, ωh for the full-five dimensional model was high (.90), but considering the  subscale 
coefficients, the different contribution of each dimension can help explain the variance in CSQ-SF 
scores. The ωt coefficients for each CSQ-SF subscale revealed that internality had a lower internal 
consistency (.21) compared to the other subscales (.73 – .91). Conversely, the ωh subscale coefficient 
was high for internality (.57) compared to the other subscales (.00 – .17), indicating that the score 
variance of internality is explained not by the general factor but by its specific domain. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that when a bifactor model for the five CSQ dimensions was specified, several 
internality items showed negative factor loadings both on the general factor and on the specific factor 
(see Supplementary Materials Appendix B), indicating their poor consistency both with the negative 
cognitive style construct as a whole and with the Internality dimension. These additional 
considerations on the internality dimension consistency lean in favor of a four-dimensional bifactor 
model of the CSQ-SF that supports the validity of the computation of a composite total score 
(consisting of globality, stability, negative consequences and self-worth implications).  
 
Table 2  
Confirmatory factor analyses of the CSQ-SF with and without the internality dimension: model 
comparison by DWLS method (N = 770) 
Model 2 df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA CI SRMR 
With Internality        
One-factor  13759.92 2484 .908 .905 .077 [.076; .078] .072 
Five-factor  12443.57 2474 .919 .916 .072 [.071; .074] .069 
Bifactor  10303.97 2412 .936 .932 .065 [.064; .067] .063 
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Without Internality        
One-factor  7970.67 1484 .939 .937 .075 [.074; .077] .070 
Four-factor  7045.76 1478 .948 .945 .070 [.068; .072] .066 
Bifactor  6097.41 1482 .956 .953 .065 [.064; .067] .062 
Note: 2 = Chi-Square; df = Degrees of Freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; RMSEA CI = RMSEA 95% Confidence Interval; 
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
 
Table 3 
Internal consistency coefficients of the CSQ-SF and its subscales 
Model Internality Globality Stability Negative 
consequences 
Self-worth 
implications 
ωt ωh 
With Internality        
One-factor       .94  
Five-factor  .21 .81 .79 .73 .91 .95  
Bifactor  .57 .00 .16 .17 .15 .96 .90 
Without Internality       
One-factor       .97  
Four-factor  - .81 .80 .75 .90 .96  
Bifactor  - .01 .13 .11 .23 .96 .92 
Note: t = Omega Total; h = Omega Hierarchical. 
 
2.2.3 Empirical distributions of the CSQ-SF dimensions in the low and high cognitive 
vulnerability groups 
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Based on the CSQ-SF total standardized scores, individuals who scored in the lowest 15th 
percentile formed the low cognitive vulnerability group (N = 116), whereas individuals who scored 
in the highest 85th percentile and above formed the high cognitive vulnerability group (N = 116). The 
empirical distributions of low and high cognitive vulnerability groups were compared on the five 
CSQ-SF subscales. Figure 1 shows that the globality, stability, self-worth implications, and negative 
consequences subscales discriminate well between individuals with low and high cognitive 
vulnerability, whereas the two groups’ distributions substantially overlap on the internality 
dimension. The estimated area of overlap (Pastore, 2017) between the empirical distributions of the 
low and high cognitive vulnerability groups was 25.76% for internality, whereas it was close to 0 for 
the other subscales (globality: 0.83%; stability: 0.79%; negative consequences: 2.41%; self-worth 
implications: 0.89%).  
 
 
Figure 1. Score distributions of the low cognitive vulnerability group (N = 116) and the high 
cognitive vulnerability group (N = 116) on the CSQ-SF dimensions. Score distributions are 
depicted by boxplots in Panel A and by empirical density distributions in Panel B. 
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2.3 Discussion 
The CSQ-SF consists of five dimensions assessing internality, globality, stability, negative 
consequences, and self-worth implications. Nevertheless, according to the hopelessness theory, 
internality should not be considered as a vulnerability factor for depression. 
In Study 1, we evaluated the CSQ-SF and the revised CSQ-SF (i.e., without internality) to 
provide statistical justification, and not only a theoretical one, for the CSQ-SF’s scoring. Our results 
provide several pieces of evidence for excluding the internality dimension from the computation of 
the total CSQ-SF score. First, the internality subscale showed  a weak CDTC, unveiling its 
inconsistency with the other four CSQ-SF dimensions. Second, CFAs indicated the superiority of the 
bifactor model of the CSQ-SF without internality with respect to the model in which internality was 
included, both in terms of goodness of fit and in terms of internal consistency (ωt = .96; ωh = .92). 
Third, the internality dimension had the worst discriminant power between individuals with low and 
high cognitive vulnerability to depression (overlapping = 25.76%) compared to the other CSQ-SF 
dimensions. Because internal attributions are not constitutive elements that all individuals with a 
negative cognitive style share, internality should be scored separately from the composite CSQ-SF 
score.  
 
 
3. Study 2 
In Study 2, we examined the factor structure of the CSQ-SF in a new sample and further 
investigated the construct validity of the revised CSQ-SF (i.e., using the composite score of globality, 
stability, negative consequences, and self-worth implications) by means of a predictive validity study. 
By using the Interpretation Bias Questionnaire (IBQ; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010) as a criterion, 
we hypothesized that individuals with high cognitive vulnerability would be more likely to generate 
negatively-valenced interpretations than individuals with low cognitive vulnerability. We 
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administered a negative mood induction procedure before the generative interpretation task (i.e., IBQ) 
to activate the individuals’ putative latent cognitive vulnerability (Segal & Ingram, 1994). 
 
3.1 Materials and Methods 
3.1.1 Participants and procedures 
Participants were recruited by means of adverts posted on university social network groups 
and face-to-face requests to students from introductory undergraduate classes at the University of 
Padua, Italy. Survey participants were informed on the confidential nature of the data collection and 
that we were selecting subjects for a laboratory session on the basis of their questionnaire scores. A 
total of 300 participants (182 females) completed online a prescreening questionnaire composed by 
the CSF-SF and the BDI-II. Most of the participants were university students (89%) with a mean age 
of 23.5 years (SD = 3.8). At the end of the data collection phase, two experimental groups were formed 
on the basis of the study 2 sample’s percentiles: Individuals who scored in the 15th percentile (CSQ-
SF  107) were placed in the low cognitive vulnerability group, whereas individuals who fell in the 
85th percentile and above (CSQ-SF  169)  were placed in the high cognitive vulnerability group. 
After one to three weeks, the selected participants were asked to join the study that took place in the 
laboratory. Twenty-one subjects refused or were unable to take part in the second phase. The 
laboratory sample consisted of 72 participants. No differences were found for age and student status 
distributions across high and low cognitive vulnerability groups. Participants were tested individually 
in a private room on a computer by a trained research assistant. Participants completed again the 
CSQ-SF to test the stability of their levels of negative cognitive style. The laboratory session 
consisted of the negative mood induction procedure implemented in the open-source program 
OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and the generative interpretation task 
administration. In order to avoid participants to comply with experimental demands (Westermann, 
Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), the true purpose of the mood induction procedure was hidden until the 
end of the experimental session. All participants provided written informed consent before and after 
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participating in this study, which was approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Padua 
(protocol number 2426).  
 
3.1.2 Instruments 
Beck Depression Inventory–II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Sica, Ghisi, & Lange, 
2007) is a self-rating scale composed of 21 items that evaluate key symptoms of depression, including 
cognitive, emotional, and somatic aspects. The respondents are asked to use a 4-point Likert-type 
scale to indicate the severity of their symptoms (0 = least, 3 = most). The total score ranges between 
0 and 63, with higher total scores reflecting increased severity of depression symptoms. Suggested 
guidelines for cutoff scores are less than 14 for no or minimal depression, 14 to 19 for mild to 
moderate depression, 20 to 28 for moderate depression, and 29 or higher for severe depression. 
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). A digital VAS was implemented in OpenSesame and was 
administered at both the beginning and at the end of the negative mood induction procedure. 
Participants rated their mood by adjusting a scrollbar on a continuous line ranging from 0 on the left 
side (i.e., completely sad) to 100 on the right hand side (i.e., completely happy). The percentage of 
mood reduction after the negative mood induction procedure was measured by the following formula: 
Mood reduction % = [(VASpost – VASpre)/VASpre]  100. 
Negative Mood Induction. In order to induce a sad mood, a combined mood induction was 
administered. Participants consecutively: (a) listened to Albinoni's Adagio in G Minor over a period 
of 3:06 min while reading a set of 16 negative Velten statements (e.g., “Everything seems utterly 
futile and empty” or “I’ve doubted that I’m a worthwhile person”); (b) read a sad extract from the 
novel La Storia by Elsa Morante (1974) in which a mother is crazed with grief after her child died 
following an epileptic attack; and (c) watched a sad sequence from the movie The Champ (Lovell & 
Zeffirelli, 1979) depicting a young boy crying at the death of his father (2:00 min). 
Interpretation Bias Questionnaire (IBQ; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). The IBQ is a 
generative task in which participants are asked to vividly imagine themselves in 10 different situations 
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(e.g., “You’re giving a speech. People in the audience start laughing. Why?”) and to decide what they 
feel would have caused those situations if the events were actually happening to them. The IBQ was 
adapted into Italian by the first author and back-translated by a native English speaker (see 
Supplementary Materials Appendix C). In the present study, participants were instructed to think all 
the possible explanations (interpretation generation) and to select and write down one interpretation 
they deemed the “most likely” explanation for the situation. For each generated interpretation, 
participants rated on two 5-point Likert-type scales (from 1 = “not at all” to 5 = “extremely”) the 
positive valence of their interpretation (“To what extent do you think this explanation is positive?”) 
and the negative valence of their interpretation (“To what extent do you think this explanation is 
negative?”). The IBQ scores were calculated using the mean valence of participants’ ratings on their 
generated interpretations (IBQ = (IBQpos - IBQneg)/10). IBQ values range between -4 and 4. 
Negative values of IBQ are indicators of a negative interpretation bias, whereas positive values of 
IBQ reflect a positive valence attributed to their own interpretations.  
 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Replication of the Cognitive Style Questionnaire – Short Form factorial structure. 
We conducted a CFA on Study 2’s prescreening data (N = 300) to evaluate the factorial 
structure of the CSQ-SF, as investigated in Study 1 (Table 4). The CFA results replicated the findings 
of Study 1 and corroborated the superiority of the bifactor model without internality. 
 
Table 4 
Confirmatory factor analyses of the CSQ-SF with and without the internality dimension: model 
comparison by DWLS method (N = 300) 
Model 2 df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA CI SRMR ωt ωh 
With Internality          
RUNNING HEAD: Measuring Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression 
 
One-factor  7372.35 2484 .918 .916 .081 [.079; .083] .085 .95  
Five-factor  6380.58 2474 .935 .933 .073 [.070; .075] .080 .97  
Bifactor  5405.82 2412 .950 .947 .064 [.062; .067] .074 .97 .90 
Without Internality          
One-factor  4133.26 1484 .950 .948 .077 [.074; .080] .080 .98  
Four-factor  3541.50 1478 .961 .959 .068 [.065; .071] .074 .97  
Bifactor  3130.05 1482 .968 .965 .063 [.060; .066] .070 .97 .92 
Note: 2 = Chi-Square; df = Degrees of Freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; RMSEA CI = RMSEA 95% Confidence Interval; 
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; t = Omega Total; h = Omega Hierarchical. 
 
3.2.2 Preliminary analysis. 
Based on the composite CSQ-SF scores (without internality) of the prescreening test, we derived two 
experimental groups with the lowest (N = 40) and the highest (N = 32) negative cognitive style. 
Total scores on the CSQ-SF in the laboratory session were compared to total scores in the 
prescreening. Test-retest reliability was excellent (r = .96), indicating that cognitive style was stable 
over a period of one to three weeks.  
The high cognitive vulnerability group showed higher depressive symptoms than the low 
cognitive vulnerability group (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5 
Laboratory sample groups’ composition 
 High Low 
N total 32 40 
Sex, N females 18(56%) 22(55%) 
N studying currently 28(88%) 36(90%) 
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Age, mean (SD) 23.3(3.3) 23.6(3) 
N depressed mood (BDI-II  14) 22(69%) 5(12%) 
Depressive symptoms, mean (SD) 20.2(11.1) 7.1(7) 
Note: Number of participants for each group (N total), number and percentage of females (Sex), 
number and percentage of undergraduate students in the laboratory sample (N studying currently), 
mean age (Age), number of participants with at least mild depressive symptoms (N depressed 
mood), and mean BDI scores (Depressive symptoms). 
 
3.2.3 Effectiveness of mood induction procedure in high and low cognitive vulnerability to 
depression groups 
The reference criterion to evaluate the effect of the negative mood induction procedure was a 
minimum 20% reduction in mood (Singer & Dobson, 2007; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). Participants 
with high cognitive vulnerability to depression showed a mood reduction significantly greater than 
20% (M = 31.81, SD = 24.54), t(31) = -2.7, p = .005, d = .48. Conversely, participants with low 
vulnerability did not reach the mood reduction cutoff value of 20% (M = 16.52, SD = 22.67, d = .15).  
An independent t-test showed that mood reduction was significantly greater in the high 
cognitive vulnerability group than in the low cognitive vulnerability group, t(70) = 2.74, p = .008, d 
[95%CI] = 0.65 [0.16, 1.14]. 
 
3.2.4 Interpretation bias in high and low cognitive to depression vulnerability groups 
The IBQ mean score of participants with low cognitive vulnerability was significantly greater 
than 0 (M = 1.00, SD = 1.2), t(39) = 5.3, p < .001, d = .83, indicating a tendency to attribute a positive 
valence to their own interpretations. By contrast, individuals with high cognitive vulnerability showed 
a negative IBQ mean score (M = -.79, SD = .89) and significantly lower than 0, t(31) = -5, p < .001, 
d = .89, suggesting the presence of a negative interpretation bias. 
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In the high cognitive vulnerability group, there was a greater proportion of dysphoric 
individuals than in the low cognitive vulnerability group, χ2(1) = 21.7, p < .001; thus, it was important 
to verify if depression at the prescreening could be a relevant third variable that may explain the 
relationship between negative cognitive style at the prescreening and negative interpretation bias 
during the experimental session. In addition, it was also important to control for mood deterioration 
following the negative mood induction procedure. We thus specified a linear model in which the IBQ 
scores during the experimental session were predicted by cognitive vulnerability to depression (high 
vs. low), depressive symptoms at the prescreening, and mood variation consequent to the negative 
mood induction during the experimental session (see Table 6). Results showed that negative cognitive 
style is a significant predictor of negative interpretation bias, with the high vulnerability group 
showing significantly more negative interpretations than the low vulnerability group, b = -1.32, p < 
.001. Furthermore, our data suggest that negative interpretation bias shares a substantial amount of 
variance with negative cognitive style (sr2 = .14), even greater than that shared with depressive 
symptoms (sr2 = .07). By contrast, concurrent mood variation consequent to the negative mood 
induction (VAS) did not account for any significant part of the variance in the IBQ scores. In sum, 
results suggest that individuals with higher scores at the CSQ-SF are more likely to show negative 
interpretation bias, regardless of the intensity of their reported depressive symptoms and mood 
fluctuations. 
 
Table 6 
Linear model predicting negative interpretation bias from negative cognitive style, depressive 
symptoms, and mood deterioration following the mood induction procedure. 
Predictor b b 95% CI sr2 sr2 95% CI 
High vulnerability group -1.32*** [0.71, 1.93] .14 [.02, .26] 
BDI-II -0.04** [-0.07, -0.01] .07 [-.02, .16] 
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VAS -0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] .01 [-.02, .03] 
Note: b = unstandardized regression weights; sr2 = squared semi-partial correlation.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The first result of Study 2, is that we replicated the factor structure of the revised CSQ-SF that 
we found in Study 1 in a new sample. Study 2 was motivated by the hypothesis that individuals with 
high cognitive vulnerability to depression would be more prone to show a negative interpretation 
bias. The results of the generative interpretation task confirmed our hypothesis: Participants with high 
cognitive vulnerability tended to interpret ambiguous situations in a negative manner compared to 
the low cognitive vulnerability group, which, conversely, tended to provide a positive valence to the 
interpretations. Importantly, this result was observed also when statistically controlling for depressive 
symptoms at the baseline. Furthermore, when we examined the effects of mood induction across the 
two groups, we found a stronger mood reduction (below the -20% threshold) in the high vulnerability 
group than in the low vulnerability group, although this enhanced susceptibility to mood modification 
did not impact the interpretation bias. 
 
4. General Discussion 
Taken together, the results of our two studies strengthen the construct validity of the CSQ-SF. 
Study 1 shows that the factorial structure of the CSQ-SF is well accounted for by a bifactor model 
that simultaneously accounts for the specificity of the attributional dimensions and the 
unidimensional nature of the negative cognitive style construct. The bifactor model of the four CSQ-
SF dimensions (globality, stability, negative consequences, and self-worth implications) provides a 
good fit to the sample’s data. Indeed, the comparison between the confirmatory factor models of the 
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CSQ-SF with and without internality supports a factor solution without the internality dimension, 
both in terms of goodness of fit and greater internal consistency. In Study 2, we replicated this factor 
structure in a new sample, providing even greater evidence about the solidity of the CFA results. On 
the basis of these factor-analytic results, we suggest computing the total CSQ-SF score by summing 
the scores related to the dimensions of globality, stability, negative consequences, and self-worth 
implications (i.e., without the internality dimension). Furthermore, in line with previous observations 
that internal attributions do not contribute to explain hopelessness and depressive symptoms 
(Metalsky & Joiner, 1992), our results support the choice of excluding the internality dimension from 
the total score computation because of the low CDTCs and CITCs, because of the low internal 
consistency derived by the  coefficients computed by considering and by excluding the internality 
dimension, and because of the low discriminant power of the internality dimension between 
individuals with low and high cognitive vulnerability to depression. 
At the more general level of theory integration, research on negative cognitive style has shown 
a growing interest in cognitive biases and has highlighted the similarity in the mechanisms underlying 
both the Beck model and the hopelessness theory (Pössel & Knopf, 2011). Our contribution to this 
debate is to show that the negative interpretation bias can be understood as a link between the two 
theories. The negative interpretation bias has been identified as a fundamental cognitive factor 
involved in the onset and maintenance of depression (Everaert, Podina, & Koester, 2017). In Study 
2, we showed that a negative cognitive style, which is considered a distal cognitive factor for the 
onset of depression, is associated to negative interpretation bias, which is regarded as a proximal 
cognitive cause of depression (Everaert et al., 2017). Specifically, we found that high CSQ-SF scores 
can predict a negative interpretation bias over a period of about three weeks. We also found that 
individuals with high negative cognitive style produced more intense negative interpretations 
compared to individuals with low CSQ-SF scores. This result was independent of depressive 
symptom severity and of mood deterioration following negative mood induction. Our findings thus 
show that negative cognitive style, on the one side, and negative interpretation bias, on the other, 
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despite belonging to different theoretical frameworks, are indeed closely related constructs that 
influence each other over time and together conspire in the facilitation of the onset of depressive 
symptoms. 
Several limitations of the present research should be mentioned. Despite the fact that, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the internal structure of the CSQ-SF by means of a CFA, 
we recognize the limited generalizability of our results because, although they were replicated in two 
samples, they both rely on university-age participants. Future research should generalize our findings 
to different populations by means, for instance, of multigroup-factor analysis. Furthermore, we 
highlight the weakness of several CSQ-SF items (i.e., low or negative factor loadings), probably due 
to the high rate of reverse coded items, suggesting that further refinement of the questionnaire should 
improve its psychometric properties. Regarding Study 2, future research should plan for the presence 
of a control group (i.e., with neutral or positive mood induction) to better clarify the effect of mood 
induction on the interpretation task. Moreover, the presence of a control group would give additional 
support to our claim of the stronger effectiveness of negative mood induction in the high vulnerability 
group compared to the low vulnerability group. Finally, the cross-sectional nature of the design 
prevented us from discussing further implications on the relationship between negative interpretation 
bias and negative cognitive style in predicting depression. 
In conclusion, our studies show that negative cognitive style is an important mechanism, 
whose role goes beyond that attributed by the hopelessness theory. In fact, it is likely that 
depressotypic attributions and inferences exert their influence over different components of the 
network of depressive mechanisms, such as interpretation bias. Future studies should more 
comprehensively take into account the variety of vulnerability factors of depression. 
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